An Amendment to the Constitution Is Needed to Prevent the Danger of a Standing Army

14 June 1788

MR. CHAIRMAN—Unless there be some restrictions on the power of calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions, we may very easily see that it will produce dreadful oppressions. It is extremely unsafe, without some alterations. It would be [implemented] to use the militia to a very bad purpose, if any disturbance happened in New-Hampshire, to call them from Georgia. This would harrass the people so much that they would agree to abolish the use of militia, and establish a standing army. I conceive the general government ought to have power over the militia, but it ought to have some bounds. If gentlemen say, that the militia of a neighbouring state is not sufficient, the government ought to have power to call forth those of other states, the most convenient and contiguous. But in this case the consent of the state legislatures ought to be had. On real emergencies this consent will never be denied; each state being concerned in the safety of the rest. This power may be restricted without any danger. I wish such an amendment as this, that the militia of any state should not be marched beyond the limits of the adjoining state, and if it be necessary to draw them from one end of the continent to the other, I wish such a check as the consent of the state legislature, to be provided. Gentlemen may say, that this would impede the government; and that the state legislatures would counteract it, by refusing their consent. This argument may be applied to all objections whatsoever. How is this compared to the British constitution? Though the king may declare war, the parliament has the means of carrying it on. It is not so here. Congress can do both. Were it not for that check in the British government, the Monarch would be a despot. When a war is necessary for the benefit of the nation, the means of carrying it on are never denied. If any unjust requisition be made on parliament, it will be, as it ought to be, refused. The same principle ought to be observed in our government. In times of real danger, the states will have the same enthusiasm in aiding the general government, and granting its demands, which is seen in England, when the king is engaged in a war apparently for the interest of the nation. This power is necessary, but we ought to guard against danger. If ever they attempt to harass and abuse the militia, they may easily abolish them, and raise a standing army in their stead. There are various ways of destroying the militia. A standing army may be perpetually established in their stead. I abominate and detest the idea of a government, where there is a standing army. The militia may be here destroyed by that method which has been practised in other parts of the world before. That is, by rendering them useless, by disarming them. Under various pretences, congress may neglect to provide for arming and disciplining the militia, and the state governments cannot do it, for congress has an exclusive right to arm them, &c. Here is a line of division drawn between the state and general governments. The power over the militia is divided between them. The national government has an exclusive right to provide for arming, organizing, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States. The state governments have the power of appointing the officers, and of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by congress, if they should think proper to prescribe any. Should the national government wish to render the militia useless, they may neglect them, and let them perish, in order to have a pretence of establishing a standing army.

No man has a greater regard for the military gentlemen than I have. I admire their intrepidity, perseverance, and valour. But when once a standing army is established, in any country, the people lose their liberty. When against a regular and disciplined army, yeomanry are the only defence—yeomanry, unskillful & unarmed, what chance is there for preserving freedom? Give me leave to recur to the page of history, to warn you of your present danger. Recollect the history of most nations of the world. What havock, desolation, and destruction, have been perpetrated by standing armies? An instance within the memory of some of this house, -will shew us how our militia may be destroyed. Forty years ago, when the resolution of enslaving America was formed in Great-Britain, the British parliament was advised by an artful man, [Sir William Keith] who was governor of Pennsylvania, to disarm the people. That it was the best and most effectual way to enslave them. But that they should not do it openly; but to weaken them and let them sink gradually, by totally disusing and neglecting the militia. [Here MR. MASON quoted sundry passages to this effect.] This was a most iniquitous project. Why should we not provide against the danger of having our militia, our real and natural strength, destroyed? The general government ought at the same time to have some such power. But we need not give them power to abolish our militia. If they neglect to arm them, and prescribe proper discipline, they will be of no use. I am not acquainted with the military profession. I beg to be excused for any errors I may commit with respect to it. But I stand on the general principles of freedom, whereon I dare to meet any one. I wish, that in case the general government should neglect to arm and discipline the militia, that there should be an express declaration, that the state governments might arm and discipline them. With this single exception I would agree to this part, as I am conscious the government ought to have the power.

They may effect the destruction of the militia, by rendering the service odious to the people themselves, by harassing them from one end of the continent to the other, and by keeping them under martial law.

The English parliament never pass[ed] a mutiny bill but for one year. This is necessary, for otherwise the soldiers would be on the same footing with the officers, and the army would be dissolved. One mutiny bill has been here in force since the revolution. I humbly conceive there is extreme danger of establishing cruel martial regulations. If at any time our rulers should have unjust and iniquitous designs against our liberties, and should wish to establish a standing army, the first attempt would be to render the service and use of militia odious to the people themselves; subjecting them to unnecessary severity of discipline in time of peace, confining them under martial law, and disgusting them so much, as to make them cry out, give us a standing army. I would wish to have some check to exclude this danger; as, that the militia should never be subject to martial law, but in time of war. I consider and fear the natural propensity of rulers to oppress the people. I wish only to prevent them from doing evil. By these amendments, I would give necessary powers, but no unnecessary power. If the clause stands as it is now, it will take from the state legislatures what divine providence has given to every individual—the means of self defence. Unless it be moderated in some degree, it will ruin us, and introduce a standing army.

Source: (Rutland, The Papers of George Mason, Vol. III., p.1073-1076. (1970)).