Springfield M1-A

"RESOLVED that this Colony and Dominion of Virginia can not be considered as a conquered Country; and if it was, that the present Inhabitants are the Descendants not of the Conquered, but of the Conquerors." - George Mason, Fairfax County Resolves 1774.

"Whereas, from the landing at Jamestown on to the expansion of this nation to the Pacific coast, a peaceful society developed in the area that was wrested from the wilderness by sturdy riflemen armed with their personal weapons and skilled in their use;" Va. HJR No. 21. (1964).

This site is only an information site on the law in Virginia. The following information is not intended as legal advice and should not be relied upon as accurate or current. Consult an Attorney, or the Commonwealth's Attorney's Office or the Office of the Attorney General.

No person except employees, police officers, or officers of the department shall carry or possess firearms of any description, or airguns, within the park. This regulation shall not apply in areas designated for hunting by the Department of Conservation and Recreation. This regulation also shall not apply to the carrying of concealed handguns within state parks by holders of a valid concealed handgun permit issued pursuant to §18.2-308 of the Code of Virginia.

See Also: ""It is not conceivable that a city can provide the ways and means for a private individual or corporation to discriminate against its own citizens...The Judgment of this court is not rendered without the full realization of the impact of this decision on the State Park system in Virginia. The future course rests in the hands of the elected and appointed representatives of the Commonwealth. This opinion follows the law as set forth in all decided cases touching on the subject matter, and it is rather significant that no legal authority has been cited by the defendants to justify any other conclusion. The contention that a normal lessor-lessee relationship should be permitted in leases of public property must give way to the constitutional rights of the citizens as a whole.

A decree will be entered in the form of a declaratory judgment stating the Plaintiff's rights to use and enjoy the facilities at Seashore State Park have been violated under the Constitution of the United States, and a permanent federal injunction will be granted..." Tate v. Department of Conservation and Development 133 F. Supp. 53 (1955).

2)  "Referring to Code  18.2-308, the Supreme Court of Virginia  has stated "'[t]he purpose of the statute [is] to interdict the  practice of carrying a deadly weapon about the person, concealed,  and yet so accessible as to afford prompt and immediate use.'"   Code  18.2-308.2(A) defines a concealed weapon as one "hidden  from common observation."  "Such a weapon is 'hidden from common  observation when it is observable[,] but is of such deceptive  appearance as to disguise the weapon's true nature.'"   Therefore, where a weapon is "hidden from all except those with an unusual or  exceptional opportunity to view it," it is hidden from public view  and "concealment of it in this fashion [is] unlawful."   Here, the  evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the  Commonwealth, demonstrates that initially McKay was unable to see  the gun "because [Fountain's] leg was next to it."  Further, once  Fountain got out of the car and McKay "stuck [his] head in the  car," he could see "very little" of the pellet gun - namely, "just  the very back of the grip" of the gun, protruding above the seat.   From this evidence, the fact finder could infer beyond a  reasonable doubt that the pellet gun was "hidden from all except those with an unusual or exceptional opportunity to view it" and therefore, that it was concealed from public view. " - James Fountain v. Commonwealth, Va. App. (2002 Unpublished).
 
 

3)    "The officer later testified that he did not see the gun when he first saw the defendant because "of the bag over his right side."  Similarly, the trial court could have reasonably inferred that the gun was not visible to the officer because it was covered with the duffle bag. If the gun was in the defendant's right rear pocket and its handle, the only part extending outside of his pocket, was covered by the duffle bag, the weapon was hidden from common observation.  It was hidden from all except those with an unusual or exceptional opportunity to view it.  The defendant had no permit to carry a weapon so hidden from public view.  Therefore, his concealment of it in this fashion was unlawful." - Main v. Commonwealth, Va. App. (1995 Unpublished)

4)   Pruitt v. Commonwealth, ___Va. ___S.E.2d__,__ (2007)

"By contrast, in this case, the issue is whether a weapon is concealed "about [the] person" of the defendant as contemplated by Code § 18.2-308(A) when he places it into a closed compartment inside a vehicle as he is exiting the vehicle. In all previous cases decided by this Court and the Court of Appeals construing the term "about his person" where the weapon was not concealed by or in the defendant's clothing, the issue was whether the weapon remained "so accessible as to afford prompt and immediate use" by the defendant while it was concealed. Sutherland, 109 Va. at 835, 65 S.E. at 15....The undisputed facts in the instant case are clearly distinguishable from those in Schaaf, Leith, and Watson.

There simply is no evidence demonstrating that Pruitt remained in the vehicle for any appreciable length of time beyond that necessary to place his pistol in the console compartment. Granting all reasonable inferences to the Commonwealth, the evidence established that Pruitt placed the pistol inside the console compartment as he was exiting his vehicle. Once he exited the vehicle and closed the door, the pistol was no longer accessible to him so as to afford "prompt and immediate use." Thus, we hold that at no time while the pistol was concealed inside the console compartment was it "about [Pruitt's] person" as required by the statute."

5) "Appellant Robert B. Leith was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Code 18.2-308. Leith contends that because his pistol was in the locked console of his automobile, the pistol was not a concealed weapon carried "about his person" and was not "readily accessible to him." We disagree and affirm his conviction." - Leith v. Commonwealth 17 Va. App. 620, 440 S.E.2d 152, (1994). 

See Also: Weatherford v. Commonwealth, Va . App., (2005 Unpublished) ( Darkness does not allow gun to be in plain view?)

6) "Handbags are made in various sizes, colors and styles, and some are designed to carry a great number of articles deemed necessary or convenient by the carrier. The bags are often supported by shoulder straps and are easily opened and closed by devices such as zippers, buckles or stays. A pistol carried in such a bag is not only near and about the carrier's person, hidden from common observation, but in some handbags it is so accessible that it could be fired without being removed therefrom. "[i]t is so connected with the person as to be readily accessible for use or surprise if desired.. . ." Sutherland, supra, 109 Va. at 835, 65 S.E. at 15.

A gun in a saddlebag, although not readily accessible, did provide a measure of protection to a horseman traveling primarily in rural areas. It did not pose a serious and immediate threat to others. A gun in a shoulder bag or a large handbag is accessible and could pose a major problem and danger to the general public." Schaaf v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 429, 258 S.E.2d 574, (1979).

Constructive Possession of Concealed Firearm

Aldeshawn Gadsen v. Commonwealth, Va. App. (2005 Unpublished)

"To support a conviction based upon constructive possession, "the Commonwealth must point to evidence of acts, statements, or conduct of the accused or other facts or circumstances  which tend to show that the defendant was aware of both the presence and character of the substance and that it was subject to his dominion and control." Powers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 474, 476, 316 S.E.2d 739, 740 (1984). Possession "need not always be exclusive. The defendant may share it with one or more." Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 89, 390 S.E.2d 491, 497 (1990) (en banc). However, mere proximity to a controlled item, such as a gun or narcotics, is not legally sufficient by itself to establish dominion and control. Wright v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 669, 670, 232 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1977); Fogg v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 394, 395, 219 S.E.2d 672, 673 (1975)...Thus, the evidence proved only that appellant was an occupant of a vehicle and in close proximity to the hidden revolver. This circumstantial evidence is legally insufficient to prove possession. See Powers, 227 Va. at 476, 316 S.E.2d at 740; Hancock, 21 Va. App. at 472, 465 S.E.2d at 141-42; see also Myers v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 113, 121-23, 596 S.E.2d 536, 540 (2004). (applying Hancock to reverse conviction for passenger's constructive possession of firearm secreted on passenger's floorboard inside blanket)."

A Concealed Knife
 

When A Knife is "A Weapon of Like Kind"

1) Gillman v. Commonwealth, __Va. App. __ S.E.2d __ (2007).

To be a "weapon of like kind," the knife must first be a weapon. Farrakhan, 273 Va. at  182, 639 S.E.2d at 230; see also Delcid, 32 Va. App. at 17, 526 S.E.2d at 275. Generally, a weapon is "[a]n instrument of offensive or defensive combat: something to fight with." Delcid, 32 Va. App. at 18, 526 S.E.2d at 275 (citing Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 1326 (1977)). Because a bladed instrument may be "possessed and used for non-aggressive as well as aggressive purposes," determining whether the knife "is an implement or a weapon requires consideration not only of the physical character of the instrument itself, but also of the circumstances surrounding its possession and use." Id. at 19, 526 S.E.2d at 275. Although the purpose for carrying the knife is irrelevant under Code § 18.2-308(A) and 18.2-308.2, "that purpose is one of the defining characteristics of the item in question." Id. ...Here, as shown, the knife in question has a 6-inch blade and a 5-inch handle. The blade has one dull, straight edge, and one sharp edge. Both edges come to a sharp point. The knife contains the inscription "MCR-11 Handmade" on one side, and "Taylor/Seto Surgical Japan" on the other. The knife does not fold to cover the blade. Rather, a leather sheath protects the blade. The knife is clearly not an "innocuous household [knife or an] industrial kni[fe] which may be carried for legitimate purposes." Richards, 18 Va. App. at 246 n.2, 443 S.E.2d at 179 n.2. Nor is it an implement possessed for "non-aggressive" purposes. See generally Delcid, 32 Va. App. at 19, 526 S.E.2d at 275. Moreover, Gilliam did not possess this item during the day at a job site. Instead, the knife was found in his possession after he was arrested for public intoxication around ten o'clock at night. And although Gilliam testified that he used the knife for construction, the trial court found this testimony incredible. Thus, we hold that there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that the knife in question is a weapon.

See Also: Harris v. Commonwealth, __Va.__S.E.2d__,__(2007). A box cutter is not a weapon or a concealed weapon because it is not of like kind.

2) Ohin v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 194, 622 S.E.2d 784, (2005).

"In this case, Ohin's knife is not a common pocketknife as he claims it to be. It has physical features making it similar to several of the prohibited knives listed in Code 18.2-308(A)(ii) and dissimilar to the kinds of "innocuous household and industrial knives which may be carried for legitimate purposes." Richards, 18 Va. App. at 246 n.2, 443 S.E.2d at 179 n.2. Ohin's knife has a "hilt like a sword," as the trial judge described it. This hilt includes a cross-guard to improve the stabbing capability of the knife by protecting the hand during the thrusting motion. The same can be said for the oversized, notched handle a feature that enhances the user's grip. These physical properties make the knife of "like kind" to the dirk and the switchblade, given that both are designed primarily for stabbing motions. The knife's substantial hilt and cross-guard make it quite unlike a common pocketknife, kitchen carving knife, or other type of non-fighting blade. Ohin's knife blade also locks securely when opened, much like a switchblade or a butterfly knife, and can be retracted only when unlocked. See, e.g., O'Banion, 33 Va. App. at 60, 531 S.E.2d at 605 (noting that a "retractable blade that can be locked into place" gives a knife a weapon-like quality). The blade comes to a point like a bowie knife, with one side sharpened and the other side shaped with a concave curvature. This blade design likewise improves the knife's fighting capabilities. What was said about the butterfly knife in Delcid can be said also about Ohin's knife: It has a "fixed blade, sharp point, and single-sharpened edge" affording it "unquestionable utility as a stabbing weapon." Id. at 18, 526 S.E.2d at 275; see also Richards, 18 Va. App. at 246, 443 S.E.2d at 179 (finding on "examination of the weapon's blade" it was a "weapon of like kind").

III.
In sum, the evidence supports the trial court's factual finding that Ohin's knife constitutes a "weapon of like kind" under Code 18.2-308(A)(v). We affirm Ohin's conviction, finding no error in the trial court's denial of his motion to strike the evidence."

See Also:    Samuel Kingrey v. Commonwealth , Va. App. (1999 Unpublished ), Delcid v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 14, 526 S.E.2d 273 (2000). ; See Also: Ricks v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 442, 444, 499 S.E.2d 575, 576 (1998). Holding that a common steak knife is not a concealed weapon under § 18.2-308.
 
 

3)    "Code 18.2-308(A) defines the word "weapon" to include, inter alia, "any dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife. . . or any weapon of like kind"

Contrary to the school division's assertion, the pocket knife that Brian had in his possession does not constitute a firearm within the meanings of these statutes [18.2-308.1, 22-1-2777.01(A)]. . . Applying these principles, we hold that Brian's pocket knife is not a firearm because a pocketknife is neither a dirk, bowie knife, switchblade knife, ballistic knife, nor a weapon of like kind⁶"

⁶ A "dirk" is defined as a "long straight bladed dagger formerly carried (especially) by the  Scottish Highlanders[;]2. a short sword formerly worn by British junior naval officers." Websters Third New International Dictionary, 642 (1981). A "bowie knife" is defined as "a large hunting knife adapted [especially] for knife fighting and common in western frontier regions and having a guarded handle and a strong single-edge blade typically 10 to 15 inches long with its back straight for most of its length and then curving concavely and sometimes in a sharpened edge to the point." id at 262, A "switchblade knife" is defined as " a pocketknife having the blade spring-operated so that pressure on a release catch causes it to fly open." id. at 2314. A "ballistic knife" is defined as "any knife with a detachable blade that is propelled by a spring-operated mechanism." Code 18.2-308(N) - Wood v. Henry County Public Schools, 255 Va. 85, 495 S.E.2d 255, (1998).

The term curtilage according to the Virginia Courts is defined in the following cases:

Robinson v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 533, 625 S.E.2d 651 (2006. En Banc) / Robinson v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 23, 614 S.E.2d 667 (2005).

"Because homeowners possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage surrounding their homes, Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984), "the curtilage . . . warrants the Fourth Amendment protections that attach to the home." Id.; see also Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 1, 15, 497 S.E.2d 474, 481 (1998) ("Consistent with the common law understanding of the extent of the 'home,' the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment protections that apply to the house also apply to the 'curtilage' of the house."). Because the Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage to the same extent as the home, a police officer may not enter the curtilage without a warrant, exigent circumstances, or pursuant to an express or implied invitation from the occupant. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980) ("To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent circumstances . . . ." (internal quotations omitted)).

Generally, the curtilage of a home is the "area around the home to which the activity of home life extends." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180; see also Wellford v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 297, 301, 315 S.E.2d 235, 238 (1984) (defining "curtilage" as the "space necessary and convenient, habitually used for family purposes and the carrying on of domestic employment; the yard, garden or field which is near to and used in connection with the dwelling"). "[W]hether a particular place is within the curtilage of the home is determined on a case-by-case basis." Jefferson, 27 Va. App. at 16, 497 S.E.2d at 481 (citing United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 n.4 (1987)). In determining whether the area in question constitutes curtilage, "particular reference" to the following four factors is helpful:

[1] the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home,

[2] whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home,

[3] the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and

[4] the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.

Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301; Jefferson, 27 Va. App. at 16, 497 S.E.2d at 481. "[T]hese factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration-whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301."

See Also: Commonwealth v. Bryant, Va. App. (2005 Unpublished)
 

 
"Under the Fourth Amendment, a search is an invasion into a space or area where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 'person,' or the person's 'houses,' 'papers,' or 'effects.'" Hughes v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 447, 455, 524 S.E.2d 155, 159 (2000).

To determine whether a citizen "enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy . . . we consider whether he [or she] has exhibited an expectation of privacy in the object and whether that expectation is one that 'society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.'" Anderson v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 565, 576, 490 S.E.2d 274, 279 (1997) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)), aff'd, 256 Va. 580, 507 S.E.2d 339 (1998). "[W]here private lands are exposed to observation by members of the public who may legitimately come upon the property, a citizen does not reasonably have an expectation of privacy in areas that the passing public can observe." Shaver, 30 Va. App. at 795, 520 S.E.2d at 396.

Here, appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the front entrance to his apartment, an area "observable by members of the public who might approach [his] residence, pass by, or lawfully be upon [the] property.""

Rooming House Common Area Protected Under the 4th Amendment

Logan v. Commonwealth, 47. Va. App. 168, 622 S.E.2d 771 (2005 En Banc).

"Logan's residence was not a vacation home, but the regular dwelling for fifteen people. The rooming house "was not a hotel, restaurant, or public place where the public was invited or had the right to come and go at will." Brown v. United States, 83 F.2d 383, 385 (3d Cir. 1936). The rooming house was Logan's home "and so far as the unlawful entry and search affected him,  it violated his constitutional rights." Id. at 386. We hold that the common areas of the rooming  house were part of Logan's "home" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. "

Search Engines For the State of Virginia

Code of Virginia

Administrative Code of Virginia

Virginia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals Court Cases

1) A Virginia concealed handgun permit is not recognized by the Federal Government and therefore United States Code generally prohibits firearms in government buildings/facilities including Courts (See U.S. v. McArthur, 108 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1997), See Also: U.S. v. Murray, 271 F.3d 349 (1st Cir. 2001),  Post Offices (Post Office: Title 39 Exemption),   National Park Service land  , National Wildlife Refuge , and Military Installations (varies by installation) including Arlington Cemetery. Check with appropriate Government agency/facility for regulations. See Title 18 , Chapter 44.
 

See Also:
 

United. States v. Lofton, 233 F.3d 313 (4th Cir. 2000). "Whether or not the general public may carry weapons in a given park is not a discretionary decision made by the park superintendent under regulation 1.5(a), but instead is a decision controlled by the statutes and regulations governing that park. And because the prohibition against weapons in Oxon Cove Park springs from the system-wide prohibition of regulation 2.4, and not from any park-specific decision made under the authority of regulation 1.5(a), the notice provisions of regulation 1.7 are therefore inapplicable....Given our conclusion that notice of the weapons ban need not be given, the park manager's testimony about the posting of C.F.R. regulations, whether true or false, is simply immaterial to the question of whether Lofton unlawfully possessed a weapon at the park. "

2) National Forest lands are  under the jurisdiction of the Virginia Department of Game and Inland Fisheries. 4VAC15-40-60. Hunting with dogs or possession of weapons in certain locations during closed season.
 

3) Interstate Transport of Firearms
 
 

18USC 926(A) Transportation of firearms.
 

"Notwithstanding any other provision of any law or any rule or regulation of a State or any political subdivision thereof, any person who is not otherwise prohibited by this chapter from transporting, shipping, or receiving a firearm shall be entitled to transport a firearm for any lawful purpose from any place where such person may lawfully possess and carry such firearm to any other place where such person may lawfully possess and carry such firearm if, during such transportation the firearm is unloaded, and neither the firearm nor any ammunition being transported is readily accessible or is directly accessible from the passenger compartment of such transporting vehicle: Provided, That in the case of a vehicle without a compartment separate from the driver's compartment the firearm or ammunition shall be contained in a locked container other than the glove compartment or console."

Local or Regional Jail Officer May Carry Concealed Handgun Under the federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004 if they Have a Concealed Handgun Permit

Op. Va. Att'y Gen. No. 05-026 June (2005).

Accordingly, it is my opinion that a local or regional jail officer14 who is not part of a local police or sheriff’s department, may meet the definition of a "qualified law enforcement officer" for purposes of the federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act of 2004. Further, it is my opinion that pursuant to state law a regional jail authority may prohibit its officers in general, or an officer in particular, from carrying a concealed weapon absent a valid concealed handgun permit.

5) ATF On-line. For Federal Government Firearm Regulations/Publications

6) Title 10, Section 4309. Rifle ranges: availability for use by members and civilians  

All rifle ranges constructed in whole or in part with funds provided by the United States may be used by members of the armed forces and by persons capable of bearing arms.

Federal Search Engines

Supreme Court of the United States Opinions.

Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).

United States Code.

Check    NRAILA    for more information on individual state laws
 

Virginia now Issues Non Resident Permits and the application forms are issued through the Virginia State Police.

Section 2.2-505 of the Code of Virginia authorizes the  Attorney General of Virginia to render official opinions to the Governor,   members of the General Assembly, judges, the State Corporation Commission, state agency  heads, and certain local officials. 
 

The Attorney General does not render  opinions on matters of local concern and procedure. Op. Va. Att'y Gen No. 04-052 (2004)

Click on the link below to find Attorney General opinions on firearms or concealed carry. Search by word or code such as 18.2-308

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